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ABSTRACT 
 
The world-wide electricity sector reforms have led to a search for alternative 
and innovative approaches to regulation to promote efficiency improvement in 
the natural monopoly electricity networks. A number of countries have used 
incentive regulation models based on efficiency benchmarking of the electricity 
network utilities. While most regulators have opted adopted parametric and 
non-parametric frontier-based methods of benchmarking some have used 
engineering designed ‘reference firm’ or ‘norm’ models for the purpose. This 
paper examines the incentive properties and other related aspects of the norm 
model NPAM used in regulation of distribution networks in Sweden and 
compares these with those of frontier-based benchmarking methods. We 
identify a number of important differences between the two approaches to 
regulation benchmarking that are not readily apparent and discuss their 
ramifications for the regulatory objectives and process. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Regulatory reform of natural monopoly networks is an important part of the liberalisation 
of the electricity supply industry (ESI). Effective regulation of distribution utilities can 
improve their cost efficiency and facilitate competition in the sector. Distribution network 
charges roughly stand for one-third of final electricity prices and have shown significant 
potential for efficiency improvement. Therefore, many electricity regulators have sought to 
replace the traditional and ineffective cost-plus regulation with incentive regulation models 
and benchmarking to improve the efficiency of the networks. Moreover, they have 
introduced third-party access to distribution networks in order to promote competition in 
the wholesale and retail electricity markets.  
 
At the same time, regulators are concerned with the effectiveness and long-term effects of 
incentive regulation regime on distribution networks. This concern is well placed as the 
profit incentives of regulation schemes can have important implications for investments 
and reliability of the networks. The incentive structures are also important for the active 
networks of future characterised by: responsive industrial and household demand, micro-
generation technologies, industrial CHP, decentralised renewable sources, smart meters, 
and advanced information and communications technologies. 
 
In principle, the purpose of the benchmarking techniques in incentive regulation is to aid 
the regulator in a transition period to reduce the performance gap among the companies. 
After this interim period, as the performance gap narrows, the regulation can gradually be 
based on yardstick regulation models, which mimic competitive conditions (Jamasb and 
Pollitt, 2001a). Thus the use of frontier-based benchmarking methods should generally be 
with a view to use in an interim period. Reducing the performance gap may take longer 
than initially anticipated e.g., in the UK the regulator Ofgem has only recently noticed clear 
indications of reduction in the efficiency gap among the distribution utilities (Pollitt, 2005). 
However, this does not change the nature of this long-term objective. 
 
One of the approaches to benchmarking of electricity distribution utilities, as part of 
incentive regulation scheme, has been the use of reference firms or norm models.1 The use 
of norm models as an alternative to frontier-based approaches to benchmarking and 
regulation is appealing to some regulators. Regulators in Spain, Chile, and Sweden have 
                                                          
1 See Jamasb and Pollitt (2001b) for a brief description of alternative approaches to incentive regulation 
and benchmarking. 
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 developed different forms of reference firm approach to regulatory benchmarking while 
the German regulator has considered the use of such models.2 Turvey (2006) suggests such 
models are superior to the frontier models in use in jurisdictions such as the UK. 
 
In this paper we evaluate the Network Performance Assessment Model (NPAM) adopted 
by the Swedish energy regulator (EMI) as a benchmarking tool in the incentive regulation 
of electricity distribution companies. The Swedish electricity sector was deregulated in 
1996. At the time of reform, there were over 250 distribution utilities operating under a 
light-handed and/or self-regulation regime.3 The EMI has, in recent years, developed the 
NPAM to oversee and benchmark the performance of electricity distribution utilities 
against efficient reference networks. The reference model is then applied within an ex-post 
regulation framework to evaluate the performance of distribution utilities based on a 
revenue cap approach and to identify those that exhibit significant inefficiency. These firms 
will then be selected for further regulatory scrutiny and may be subjected to efficiency 
improvement requirements. 
 
However, the regulatory approach based on reference models combined with ex-post 
assessments has led to serious conflicts between the regulator and a number of utilities 
resulting in lengthy legal proceedings involving court rulings and appeal cases. Therefore, 
the use of reference firm models in network regulation in Sweden offers an opportunity to 
examine the merits of this alternative approach to benchmarking and incentive regulation 
of natural monopolies in network industries. In this study we present an assessment of the 
NPAM as an incentive regulation tool. 
 
The main focus of this paper is on the incentive properties of the NPAM and the 
regulatory framework within which the model is implemented. The performance of 
incentive regulation and its associated benchmarking regime is highly dependent on the 
incentive properties and the wider regulatory context within which these are implemented. 
Section 2 discusses some important and relevant features of the model and related aspects 
of the incentive regulation process within which the NPAM is applied. Section 3 addresses 
the main questions and the related issues associated with the implementation of the model 
by way of a set of evaluation criteria as reference points for an efficient incentive regulation 
model. Section 4 is conclusions and policy recommendations. 
 
 
                                                          
2 See Agrell and Bogetoft (2003) for a review of the reference firm models in these countries. 
3  The number of utilities has been declining in recent years as a result of many mergers and acquisitions. 
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 2. The Swedish Reference Model Approach and Network Regulation 
- Features and Application 
 
From a methodological point of view, the NPAM is an engineering approach to develop an 
economic model of electricity distribution networks. The model is based on designing a 
fairly efficient model of each distribution networks based on a number of standard 
technical and economic information. A separate reference model is then developed for the 
service area of each real distribution network. The resulting models then serve as reference 
or benchmark for assessing overall efficiency (cost and quality of service) of the real 
networks on which they have been modelled. Real networks whose efficiency will deviate 
more than a pre-defined degree will be subject to regulatory scrutiny and can be required to 
achieve specific performance targets. The development of the NPAM for each real 
network consists of a set of specific steps as summarized in Box 1 (Stem, 2004). 
 
An overall benchmarking model should reflect the main costs and other significant aspects 
of operation of networks. Broadly, the NPAM is an integrated or “all-in-one” incentive 
model incorporating operating and maintenance expenditures (Opex), capital expenditures 
(Capex), quality of service, and network losses in a single model. Aggregation of these 
important elements into a single model has useful efficiency and incentive properties. Firms 
can adjust their inputs and outputs more efficiently by weighting the incentives and trade-
offs between them while taking own individual costs and circumstances into account. 
 
Although pursuit of profit offers strong cost saving and efficiency improvement incentives 
these must be sought through suitable regulation frameworks (Domah and Pollitt, 2001). 
The incentive regulation model in Sweden based on benchmarking using norm models in 
annual ex-post reviews could be viewed within the context of its institutional setting. The 
predominant state and local ownership of the networks in Sweden could have been 
influential in adopting a somewhat modest departure from the self-regulation mode that 
was in place prior to the reform.4
 
The NPAM does not measure relative inefficiency of firms using real reference firms as in 
conventional incentive regulation and benchmarking. Rather, the NPAM develops an 
efficient, though not optimised, design of real firm as individual benchmarks. In this 
respect, NPAM differs from frontier benchmarking approaches that use Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS), and Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA) techniques that measure relative efficiency of firms relative to a 
                                                          
4 Also the Norwegian electricity sector has a long tradition of local ownership. However, since the 1980s, 
there has been a shift in emphasis to economic approach (relative to technical) to regulation, a trend that 
is evident in the post reform regulation in Norway (see e.g. Thue, 1993). 
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 nest practice or efficient frontier made of real firms. Also, the NPAM does not explicitly 
mimic market competition among real firms. In effect, NPAM assigns individual 
benchmarks to each firm. Therefore, NPAM differs from a conventional yardstick 
regulation based on a common benchmark. It also represents an efficient benchmark based 
on a new network while making allowance for the age of the actual network. 
 
 
i. Information on the geographic co-ordinates of all customers for each network 
company is obtained. 
ii. Information is collected on customers: numbers, energy, and power. 
iii. The model creates a reference network based on technical and legal 
requirements and with high service quality standards. 
iv. Using the reference network NPAM derives an installation register for: 
▪ Meters of line per bleeding point 
▪ A density measure to every meter of line 
▪ Number of transformer stations 
▪ Capacity for every transformer station 
▪ A density measure for every transformer 
v. The model then calculates the investment cost of a reference firm based on 
standard costs of equipment from the Swedish Electricity Building 
Rationalisation (EBR) catalogue. 
vi. Costs of building and operating an efficient network today and related costs are 
derived from a number of cost functions for: 
▪ Capital expenditures (real cost of capital) - compensation for 
depreciation, equity, debt (risk free and risk premium) 
▪ Cost of operation and maintenance 
▪ Network administration costs 
▪ Cost of network losses 
▪ Financial costs 
▪ Return on capital 
vii. Deductions from revenues are made for quality of service using supply 
interruptions data of actual companies and customer willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
values. 
viii. Costs of the reference network are then compared against those of the actual 
networks to obtain a “charge grade” (as ratio of cost of real firms over the 
reference firm) as performance measure of the real network. 
ix. The benchmarking exercise is to take place every year ex-post and relative to the 
previous year. Firms with charge grades exceeding unity by a certain margin can 
then be subject to detail investigation and efficiency requirements by the 
regulator. 
 
Box 1: The main steps in developing reference networks using the NPAM 
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Frontier benchmarking approaches are based on within-sample observed performance. The 
use of relative efficiency in relation to a reference design bears some resemblance to 
yardstick regulation or performance standard. In NPAM, inefficiency of an individual firm 
is measured independent of the performance of other firms in the sector. Instead of 
identifying a common frontier made up of observed best practice, the regulator uses 
NPAM to identify separate benchmark or comparator for each firm. In addition, standard 
asset and component costs for the industry are used to calculate the costs of individual 
reference firms (see also Section 3.1). 
 
The reference firm is designed as if a new network would be built instantaneously. The 
model is developed using a stylised optimum design and standard assets. The measured 
inefficiency of the actual network relative to the reference firm may be due to different 
factors such as inherited design and assets, management performance, or environmental 
factors beyond the control of the management or management performance (such factors 
may since have changed). There may be firms and special cases that do not readily conform 
to the standard technology and design as in NPAM. For example, some firms may have 
large sunk investments in vacant capacity in anticipation of demand growth that has not 
materialised or have only few but large customers. The model’s methodology can therefore 
be unfavourable to some firms. 
 
An important question that arises is how an incentive regulation framework based on 
reference models and ex-post price control reviews compares to incentive regulation with 
frontier-oriented benchmarking and ex-ante price control reviews. Some key considerations 
in this regard are: 
 
▪ Ex-ante vs. ex-post regulation. Ex-ante regulation is the preferred model by the 
majority of regulators. As a regulatory contract, ex-ante regulation involves less 
uncertainty on issues such as the benchmarking model used, efficiency targets set, and 
the review process. Ex-ante regulation requires adjustments for demand growth and 
price changes but these are fairly easy to incorporate. Ex-ante incentives to achieve and 
retain efficiency gains are stronger and more certain than ex-post determination of 
gains/penalties or avoidance of regulatory intervention. Ex-post regulation is, 
therefore, more likely to lead to conflict between the firms and the regulator. It should 
be noted that, in principle, it is possible to use NPAM in ex-ante regulation. 
 
▪ Forward-looking vs. backward looking. An ex-post regulation is in effect a backward 
looking exercise. The main reservation against this is that the regulated firm is 
compared to a stylised design determined by the model that may not be accurate and 
cannot be verified. In addition, the design and operation of the real firms can be 
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 influenced by the reference model in such a way that if they had been allowed to 
evolve and improve relative to best practice of real firms. 
 
▪ Short-term vs. long-term. Price control reviews based on annual assessments of 
firms using NPAM increase uncertainty with regard to regulatory framework and 
reduce the incentive to engage in long-term efficiency improvement measures. As 
mentioned, they can also reduce the likelihood that firms can retain the efficiency gains 
achieved. This aspect will be discussed in more detail in the next sections. 
 
▪ Design. The design of the NPAM is based on that of a new network also described as 
the “greenfield” approach and based on New Present Purchase Value (Turvey, 2006). 
It is desirable that, in the long-run, utilities reach an optimum network design. In the 
short-run, however, some firms may deviate significantly from optimum design. Given 
the right incentives, asset valuation based on “brownfield” approach - i.e. the existing 
network configuration - can be also be effective in promoting greater design efficiency. 
While information on efficient design is available to the firms, flexibility and freedom 
of choice to move towards better design is likely to be more effective. In addition, 
reference models implicitly assume that firms are the sum of their constituent 
components, for example, in the form of configuration of model parameters for 
different voltage levels. However, the organisation and structure of real firms may 
deviate from those suggested by their reference models. Real firms can have synergies 
among their activities and assets and the efficiency with which these are combined and 
managed. Econometric and non-parametric approaches to benchmarking can capture 
such effects from observations of real firms. 
 
▪ Replacement cost asset valuation. The justification for the use of replacement costs 
in utility regulation is not conclusive. This is particularly the case for valuation of 
existing assets and to a lesser extent though less so for new investments (see Johnston, 
2003). The bottom-up structure of the NPAM almost requires the use of replacement 
cost and makes difficult to use other asset valuation methods in reference models. 
However, frontier-benchmarking techniques can accommodate different asset 
valuation basis. For example, the Norwegian regulator has used both book value and 
replacement values in benchmarking. Incorporating such flexibility in the NPAM, if 
methodologically sound, could require considerably more resources and costs. The key 
issue is, however, correct representation of investments going forward. 
 
A peripheral but noteworthy point is that there is a distinction between high distribution 
charges that may simply be due to high costs and those that are due to low costs but high 
profits. A company with high costs is deemed inefficient from an economic point of view. 
However, for a locally owned firm with low-cost but high charges, the implication of 
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 ineffective regulation may be mainly a question of local welfare distribution matter. 
Municipality-owned utilities are effectively user-owned and their excess profits may be 
compared with a local tax. Direct consumption taxes such as levies on fuels are more 
efficient ways of raising revenues than most tax forms due to low administrative burdens 
and collection costs.5  
 
 
3. Criteria for Evaluating NPAM in Benchmarking and Regulation 
 
Evidence from leading liberalised electricity sectors such as the UK and Norway shows 
that strong and independent incentive regulation is effective with unbundled distribution 
networks combined with benchmarking. In contrast, in New Zealand, the light-handed 
approach based on self-regulation and information disclosure resulted in distribution 
companies being the major beneficiary of the gains from liberalisation (Bertram, 2005). 
Moreover, in Germany, lack of effective regulation and regulated third-party access to 
networks helped maintain high network charges and slowed down the development of 
effective competition in the generation and retail markets (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). 
 
The effectiveness test of an incentive regulation and benchmarking model is whether the 
regime has proper incentive properties for efficient outcomes. For the purpose of this 
paper, we distinguish between two approaches that use some form of incentive regulation 
and benchmarking: (i) Network Performance Assessment Model (NPAM) which 
constitutes an engineering approach to benchmarking based on developing efficient 
networks as reference, and (ii) frontier-based benchmarking methods - i.e. those based on 
techniques such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), Corrected Ordinary Least Squares 
(COLS), and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) - and constitute an economic approach to 
benchmarking using real firms.  
 
This section specifies a set of criteria for best-practice incentive regulation based on 
theoretical merit and the accumulated practical experience. The criteria are then used to 
evaluate the incentive properties of the NPAM in an ex post regulatory setting and to 
compare this with incentive regulation with frontier-based benchmarking. The evaluation 
criteria discussed here, therefore, reflect the experience with and desirable features of best 
practice to latter type of regulation. Nevertheless, these criteria serve as a useful platform 
and reference point for assessing the NPAM and its regulatory context.  
 
 
                                                          
5  While it is possible that municipal firms are less efficient than private firms discussing the ownership 
aspect is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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 3.1 Benchmarking models should include the necessary variables 
 
The primary building blocks of the NPAM are the number of customers and the capacity 
at which they are connected to the network. The geographical co-ordinates of customers 
are used to determine the physical assets (e.g. type of cable and transformer capacity) as a 
function of location and type of customers. These assets form the basis of the model, 
which is subsequently enhanced and detailed. In comparison, frontier-based benchmarking 
models tend to use number of customers and units of energy delivered as outputs and 
often network length as proxy for customer dispersion. 
 
The NPAM takes into account the required capacity when designing a network. As Turvey 
(2006) suggests, the units of energy delivered are the throughput rather than the output of a 
network. The main service of distribution networks is to provide and maintain connection 
at adequate capacity to customers’ premises. Moreover, the amount of energy transported 
over the network is not a real cost driver but mainly serves as proxy for maximum demand 
for network capacity and can be measured accurately. Likewise, maximum demand may be 
used as proxy for network technical capacity which may not be measured accurately. 
Therefore, in this respect, the NPAM has an advantage over other benchmarking methods. 
 
The NPAM contains the necessary variables to capture the main feature of networks and 
representation of benchmark models. However, there is a risk that too many parameters 
may be built into such models which increases the complexity of the models but do not 
increase their accuracy. This in turn leaves less flexibility for the utilities to improve their 
efficiency in ways that may deviate from the structure of the benchmark model.  
 
There is, however, an important structural difference between the NPAM and frontier-
based benchmarking models. Several of the critical parameters of the NPAM are derived 
using hyperbolic tangent functions that are entirely based on customer density and five 
constant terms to resemble empirical data (Equation 1). The parameters dependent on 
customer density include: geometrical adjustment, back-up lines, back-up transformers, 
lines, cost of land for transformers, energy losses, interruption cost, and expected 
interruption cost (Stem, 2004). For each parameter at each voltage level, the functions are 
estimated using a number of “reference values”.  
 
0k
4321 )))k(x*tanh(k*k(kModTanh(x) −+=                                 (1) 
 
Where:  
x   density (meters of line/customer) 
k0, …, k4  constants 
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The high degree of conditioning on customer density distinguishes the NPAM from 
frontier based models. This may be compared to inclusion of customer density in a 
deterministic production function. In frontier-based benchmarking, this would be the same 
as including customer density directly in the parametric (SFA) or non-parametric (DEA) 
production function, implying that customer density influences the efficient frontier. In 
frontier-based benchmarking, customer density would generally be considered as an 
environmental variable - i.e. a variable over which the firm’s management has no control. 
The efficiency scores can be corrected for the effect of the environmental factors through 
second stage regressions in DEA or specifying these as environmental (z) variables in SFA. 
The importance of customer density in the NPAM and its sensitivity to this parameter is a 
strong assumption that needs to be justified with empirical analysis. 
 
The NPAM implicitly assumes that there is a standard design and efficient operation for a 
distribution network and aims to approximate this. There can be important structural and 
cost differences across utilities caused by design, organisational, and environmental factors. 
For example, in the UK, after two full five-year distribution price control reviews with 
incentive regulation and benchmarking, there were still significant variations in the cost 
structure of the 14 distribution network operators (see Ofgem, 2004a). It is also 
conceivable that there may be multiple ways of combining network designs and resources 
to achieve the same end in a given distribution area. It is difficult to establish the extent to 
which the standardised procedures of the NPAM can be aligned with the diversity of cost 
structure and design of real networks. 
 
As a long-term benchmarking model, the NPAM incorporates the main inputs and outputs 
of regulatory concern such as operating and maintenance expenditures (Opex), capital 
expenditures (Capex), service quality, and network energy losses. It is generally accepted 
that there is some scope for trade-offs between these factors and that firms can use them 
to adopt to their operating environment. If there are real firms that have a cost structure 
different from that of the reference network but are more or as efficient of them, this may 
indicate that such trade-offs can exist. However, the deterministic structure of the 
reference models does not take the possible trade-offs between these factors into account. 
In benchmarking against real firms, such trade-offs are reflected in the performance of the 
sector’s best-practice firms. Indeed there may be considerable innovation in the way such 
trade-offs are handled in real firms. 
 
A comparison of the methodology of the NPAM with that of regression-based 
benchmarking methods is noteworthy. In regression-based benchmarking models the left-
hand-side (LHS) variable (e.g. total cost) and right-hand-side (RHS) variables (e.g. energy 
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 and customer numbers as outputs) are each measured independently. There is also an 
underlying assumption about the production function built into the model through its 
specification. The “estimated” coefficients of RHS variables can signal whether a variable 
may be included in or excluded from the model. The values, signs, and significance of 
coefficients are therefore driven directly from the specific sample at hand.  
 
In the NPAM, the total cost variable is not measured independently from the LHS 
variables but is “calculated” directly from the RHS variables and density factors (and the 
industry’s average unit costs based on the EBR catalogues). In effect, the accuracy of the 
NPAM is dependent on the relevance of the pre-determined production function and 
standard factor costs (both decided prior to benchmarking). 
 
As mentioned, the costs used to calculate the asset base of the reference network in the 
NPAM are based on EBR (Electricity Building Rationalisation) catalogue. EBR is a 
voluntary collaboration between the Swedish distribution companies to improve cost 
efficiency through technical and material standardisation (Olsson and Ahs, 2001). While 
EBR reduces the regulator’s cost of information search to the regulator it cannot be 
regarded as an independent source of information in the long-run as it is dependent on the 
firms that the regulator oversees. 
 
Environmental variables 
Apart from customer density, the NPAM does not explicitly take other types of 
environmental variables into account. In frontier-based benchmarking methods such as 
SFA and DEA based on actual firms, such factors can more easily be incorporated in the 
benchmarking model. However, inclusion of too many environmental variables will add 
considerably to the complexity of the model. Moreover, controlling for such factors 
outside of the model may need to be made on a case-by-case approach using subjective 
judgements. 
 
Filippini and Wild (2001) show that in addition to customer density, other environmental 
factors such as unproductive land, forestation, and agricultural land influence the networks’ 
efficiency. A recent examination of the environmental factors of electricity and gas and 
distribution companies in the Netherlands found that factors such as soil quality, salty air, 
procurement of energy and capacity, load factors, and population and connection density 
did not show significant effect on their costs (Brattle Group, 2006). The study found that 
only the cost of water crossings longer than one kilometre and local taxes amounted to 
significant environmental effects. In addition, a study of various environmental factors on 
quality of service in Norwegian distribution companies found that, with the exception of 
maximum wind speed in coastal regions, other factors did not appear to have a strong 
influence (ECON, 2000). 
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It is also conceivable that, in the long-run, utilities are able to adapt to most aspects of their 
operating environment and the effect of environmental factors on cost and efficiency 
diminishes. Also, some positive and negative effects of environmental factors may cancel 
each other out. However, there is a need for further examination of their environmental 
factors and to develop the techniques for taking these factors into account. In addition, the 
extent and nature effect of environmental factors on firm performance may not be the 
same everywhere and they still need to be determined on a country to country basis. 
 
 
3.2 Select and or create efficient comparators 
 
Similar to frontier-based benchmarking methods, the NPAM identifies a single measure of 
overall efficiency of the real firm in relation to the reference network. In the NPAM, this 
measure is in the form of a performance ratio. The NPAM develops ‘an’ efficient model 
using a set of key parameters in a specific way. However, the NPAM’s methodology 
implies that there is a unique or standard efficient design for each real network. 
 
Moreover, a model is, by definition, only a simplified representation of a real system. A 
question is, therefore, how detailed a model should be. At one extreme, the design and 
operationalisation of an optimally designed model will be, at least, as complex as the real 
system that it attempts to represent. It can then be argued that any entity able to design the 
perfect model of a real network should, in principle, also be able own, maintain, and 
operate the network efficiently. The answer to the above questions is, therefore, that the 
NPAM is unlikely to identify and reflect a “true” or single possible efficient design and 
operation of a real network. For example, Griffel-Tatje and Lovell (1999) show that, in 
terms of operation and maintenance, the real Spanish electricity distribution utilities were 
more efficient than those of the theoretical firms. 
 
Another issue is whether the resulting reference model is useful as benchmark. When 
designing a modern and efficient structure and operation, the NPAM cannot reflect the 
historical development of the companies, which span over many years. The existing assets 
of actual firms are largely sunk costs and may represent the needs of a rather different 
demand structure and forecasts two or three decades ago. In the short-run, many firms 
have limited ability to alter their design. A clear advantage of using real firms as  
benchmark is that to the extent that real firms share have similar historical developments, 
the effect of such factors on measured relative efficiency diminishes. 
 
Moreover, following the discussion of perfect models of real systems, the NPAM does not 
appear to reduce information asymmetry between the regulator and the firm. On specific 
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 complex and technical issues, the accuracy of physical measurements, reference networks 
(e.g. GIS-based measurements) can have comparative advantage over other methods. 
However, the reference networks will not capture and reflect the complexity, dynamics, 
and synergies within all real firms in a sector. 
 
However, the use of reference models can be justified where important technical data on 
actual firms are not available, or are of very poor quality. However, in the Swedish 
distribution networks, availability and quality of data is not a significant issue. Therefore, 
the benefits of the extra information from the NPAM can be out-weighted by the burden 
of information and required resources for making purposeful use of reference models. The 
large number of reference models to which the regulator and the firms must relate 
demands considerable resources. In Chile, where there are 36 distribution utilities, the 
regulator has taken a pragmatic step by dividing these into six categories and developing a 
reference model based on a representative firm from each category. Therefore, the 
regulator and the firms, collectively, only need to relate to six reference firms. 
 
Furthermore, the NPAM and its implementation exhibit some characteristics of yardstick 
regulation regime. If firms perform better than the minimum threshold in relation to the 
reference network, they avoid being subject to regulatory scrutiny. This is in contrast to the 
conventional wisdom that advocates the use of frontier-based benchmarking methods until 
the performance gap among the firms has narrowed down. In Chile, where reference 
models have been used for a long term, considerable differences in the performance of the 
companies can be observed (see Sanhueza and Rudnick, 2004). This reinforces the 
argument that, initially, the frontier-based benchmarking should be used to narrow down 
the performance gap among the firms. In the UK, the X-factors have been instrumental in 
improving the efficiency of distribution companies (Domah and Pollitt, 2001). 
 
In Germany with many companies of diverse nature and issues with data quality than in 
Sweden, the regulator has made progress toward setting up a framework for the use of 
benchmarking methods such as SFA and DEA together with possible use of reference 
firms in setting the revenue caps.6
 
An implication of the application of the NPAM within the current regulatory framework is 
that each firm has only one specific reference model as benchmark to which it should 
relate. This transforms the process of benchmarking and the incentive regulation process 
into a one-to-one relationship between the firm and the regulator. This framework may 
therefore be characterised as “individual benchmarking”. This has certain implications for 
                                                          
6  The regulator BnetzA also intends to make supplementary use of GIS-based reference networks as part 
of the benchmarking exercise. 
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 the dynamics of the relationship and the regulatory contract between the firms and the 
regulator. For example, if a firm is able to influence the terms of its model or regulatory 
contract this does not have direct consequences for the other firms i.e. it is not a zero-sum 
game. On the other hand, frontier-based benchmarking method identifies a common 
frontier for all the firms in the sector. Therefore, the frontier-based methods can be viewed 
as “collective benchmarking” methods. Within this framework, an attempt by a firm to 
influence the terms of regulatory contract (for example, model variables or specifications) 
has also implications for other firms (see Jamasb et al., 2003; 2004). 
 
 
3.3 Consistency of benchmarking results 
 
It is difficult to identify the most appropriate and superior benchmarking techniques based 
on only theoretical grounds. The disciplinary origins of the parametric techniques, non-
parametric techniques, and reference models are very different. The inherent differences 
also result in different outcomes. Therefore, in order to gain confidence in the robustness 
and representativeness of the outcomes of the NPAM, it is important to expect a 
reassuring degree of consistency between the results of the model and those obtained from 
frontier-based benchmarking techniques. 
 
However, there is not a systematic study of reference models where their results are 
compared to those of other techniques. Some consistency criteria have been proposed to 
test how the results of different benchmarking techniques compare with those of others. 
The same consistency requirements can also be extended to those of the NPAM. Bauer et. 
al. (1998) have proposed the following consistency criteria for cross technique comparisons 
that can also be used in such an exercise: 
 
•  Similar distributions and means to DEA/COLS/SFA models 
•  Ranks orders should be reasonably correlated 
•  Similar least and most efficient firms differences 
•  Reasonable stability of results over time 
•  Results consistent with market conditions given gains subsequently achieved 
•  Some consistency with single factor productivity measures 
 
In benchmarking models with real firms, the results are, to a larger extent, data driven. 
Therefore, the position and composition of the frontier, and consequently the efficiency 
requirements for each firm can change from one price control period to the next. NPAM, 
in effect, benchmarks a firm against some updated version of itself. As a result, the use of 
reference firm as comparator as in the NPAM offers a degree of long-term stability and 
consistency with regards to the frontier applicable to each firm.  
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3.4 Ensure sufficient investments in the long-run 
 
In the NPAM, the value of the reference firm’s asset base is the new present purchase 
value of the required assets for an efficient network. The use of (depreciated) replacement 
costs in the regulation of regulated utilities has been criticised as being generous to 
companies (see Johnstone, 2003). The Norwegian regulator has used both the book value 
and the replacement value of assets in benchmarking of electricity distribution utilities 
using DEA. We do not attempt to settle the debate on the merits or shortcomings of using 
replacement value in utility regulation here. However, it is useful to note the application of 
this valuation method in a reference firm-based utility benchmarking framework. 
 
Reference firms, by the virtue of being more modern, would be expected to have higher 
capital costs and lower operating expenditures than real firms. Therefore, in principle, 
when the allowed revenues of the actual firms are benchmarked against those of the 
reference firm, this is not expected to result in under-investment in the long run. However, 
some related regulatory factors can influence the investment decisions: 
 
• The asset base of reference network may be difficult to match - If, the real 
firms are, in practice, unable to achieve the implied level of asset base as the 
reference firm they incur high capital costs for their “sub-optimum” design. 
 
•. The standard asset values may not apply - Real firms may, due to their 
inherited, sub-optimum design, or environmentally challenging service areas 
require non-standard assets or for other reasons require more costly assets than 
those of the reference firm and EBR catalogue. 
 
• Asset depreciation - If assets are depreciated and are in need of replacement 
more rapidly than assumed in the model, the real firms will attempt to keep their 
depreciated assets in service longer, or incur higher capital expenditures in relation 
to the reference firm. 
 
• The risk-free rate of return and risk premium - If the risk premium of the real 
firms (currently 2 percent), more likely for low performance firms, exceeds the 
rate allowed by the NPAM, the cost of capital and the total capital cost of the firm 
will increase. For example, if the firms’ investment plans are not approved by the 
regulator ex-ante, their risk premium may increase.  
 
An optimised reference firm cannot reflect the historical development of the real firm. 
When benchmarking based on frontier approach using real benchmark firms, to the extent 
that these have evolved through comparable time periods and economic conditions, the 
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 effect of historical development diminishes. In addition, existing networks can, in a 
transition period, have limitations in adopting current asset-based and operating costs to an 
efficient design. Moreover, there is some trade-off between operating and capital 
expenditure. It is difficult to see how the NPAM can reflect the flexibility that real firm 
have in running, maintaining, upgrading, and extending the networks. 
 
The investment efficiency incentive scheme adopted by Ofgem as part of the 2005-2010 
distribution price control review exhibits some flexibility for firms to perform better than 
their allowed and expected investments needs. This approach also enable the firms, when 
possible, to take the trade-offs with operating expenditures into consideration. For the 
2005-2010 price control period, the regulator has allowed a substantial increase in capital 
investments aimed at modernisation of the networks. The more than 40 percent increase in 
capital investments by network companies has resulted in a positive average X-factors for 
the sector as a whole. The increase in allowed investments is then accompanied by an 
incentive scheme that allows higher returns on actual investments in return for improving 
efficiency in achieving investment targets (Ofgem, 2004b). 
 
An increase in investment allowance of this magnitude reminds us that conventional 
benchmarking approaches do not send timely signals to the regulator about the need for 
asset renewal and increased capital investments across the whole sector. Limiting the 
benchmarking exercise to Opex has given Ofgem the flexibility to respond to the cyclical 
nature of investments in distribution networks and need for an increase in investments for 
network modernisation, quality of service, and distributed generation (Ofgem, 2006). 
 
Dalen (1998) examines investment incentives of firms under yardstick competition while 
distinguishing between industry-specific and firm-specific investments. The paper suggests 
that under yardstick competition, industry-specific investments with spill-overs that benefit 
all firms are reduced while, firm-specific investments that only improve the relative 
efficiency of the individual firm will increase. An example of industry-specific type of 
investments is research and development (R&D) spending, which is the subject of the next 
section. Despite their relatively small share in total spending, R&D can have significant 
long-term efficiency benefits for the sector as a whole. 
 
The NPAM is a long-term efficiency benchmarking model that includes not only capital 
and operating costs but also network energy losses and service quality in relation to an 
optimum design. However, the model is used within a short-term performance assessment 
setting - i.e. in the form of yearly applications of the model to firms. The current regulatory 
framework characterised by frequent and ex-post price reviews contradict the lead times 
necessary for the firms to achieve a new design and asset structure. 
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 Achieving long-term efficiency improvements can involve short-term increases in Capex 
and/or Opex expenditures that may not generate immediate efficiency improvements. 
Expenditure increases can deteriorate the firms’ short-term relative performance. This can 
prevent firms from embarking on efficiency improving investments that have long-term 
gains. Setting long-term efficiency improvement targets and benchmarks for the firms 
should be accompanied with the incentive to keep the benefits of efficiency gains. In ex-ante 
regulation, long regulatory periods can reduce uncertainty with regards to long-term 
investments and retaining their benefits. Moreover, the mismatch between the long-term 
horizon of investments and short price control periods can have a negative effect on terms 
and cost of financing of investments (see Ofwat/Ofgem, 2006). 
 
 
3.5 Quality of service 
 
In the absence of explicit control of quality of service in incentive regulation, due to the 
trade-offs between costs and quality, the latter is generally expected to decline. Tangerås 
(2003) argues that, when quantity is regulated, yardstick competition results in lower quality 
than under individual regulation although, under individual regulation, the quality would be 
too high. In principle, the argument can also apply to revenue and price cap regulation. 
However, evidence shows that utilities respond to incentives and regulation can prevent 
deterioration of quality. 
 
Evidence from the UK and Norway shows that, although their approaches to regulation 
differ, utilities have responded to quality of service incentives. At the same time, the non-
incentivised aspects of reliability have not necessarily improved (CPB, 2004). A survey of 
the literature in Sappington (2005) concludes that there are no simple policy solutions for 
effective regulation of quality of service but they depend on the information available to 
the regulator, institutional settings, and consumer preferences. The paper also argues in 
favour of providing the regulated firm with proper reward and penalty incentives for 
service quality when the regulator has sufficient information on consumer preferences and 
production technologies. 
 
The NPAM incorporates quality service quality into the design of reference networks. A 
monetary value of non-delivered energy is used based on service quality level in actual firms 
and estimates of consumer willingness-to-pay (WTP) for quality. The value of service 
quality is then deducted from the allowed revenue of the efficient firm. Conceptually, 
inclusion of service quality in an overall efficiency benchmarking of utilities corresponds 
has clear incentive advantages and this has been advocated in some studies (e.g. Giannakis, 
Jamasb, and Pollitt, 2005). In Norway, such approach has been used in the 2002-2007 
distribution price control and is also expected to be used for the next price control. 
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Inclusion of the cost of non-delivered energy based on WTP can affect different utilities to 
rather different degrees. Figure 1 shows the cost of energy non-supplied as percentage of 
revenue caps for 130 Norwegian distribution utilities in increasing order. As shown in the 
figure, at the extreme ends of the spectrum, some firms may be unfairly rewarded or 
penalised by inclusion of the cost of non-delivered energy. In the initial price control 
periods, the regulator must be confident about the quality of data and particular 
circumstances of ‘outlier’ firms and special cases that may give rise to large deviations from 
the main body of observations. 
 
 
Figure 1: The cost of energy not-supplied (ENS) as percentage of  
revenue cap for 130 Norwegian distribution utilities 
Source: Dalen (2006) 
 
However, there remain two issues. Firstly, using high service quality standards of optimised 
reference networks as the basis for benchmarking of real firms, some of which can have a 
different design and cost structure, can prove to be too stringent. In particular, this is likely 
to be the case at the early years of implementation of the scheme while the firms have had 
limited opportunity to adopt an updated design and cost structure. In the Norwegian 
model, the value of service quality is based on those of real firms which are likely to have 
comparable long-term historical developments. 
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 Secondly, the WTP values used are uniform across the country and for all companies. 
There is reason to believe that this value can differ across the country and among 
distribution service areas. To the extent that regional differences in WTP values are not 
reflected in the incentive scheme, the adaptation of utilities to socially efficient service 
quality levels can be distorted. A survey of WTP commissioned by the UK regulator 
Ofgem indicates that such valuation differences among different regions and consumer 
groups indeed exist (Ofgem, 2004c). The overall WTP of networks for a unit of quality also 
depends on the composition of customers. For example, industrial customers generally 
assign a higher value service quality than residential and commercial customers. 
 
Nevertheless, political sensitivities of explicit use of differentiated values of service quality 
are clear. It is conceivable that the marginal cost curve of improving service quality varies 
across companies. An implication of subjecting real firms to their marginal cost of quality 
improvements is that, in the long-run, this could result in differentiated service quality 
levels across the country. While implicit variable ‘sub-optimal’ service quality targets are 
allowed, a unit of quality is assumed to have the same value across the firms. 
 
Lindgren and Mortensen (2005) state that by average European standards, distribution 
access charges in Sweden are relatively low but quality of service is also low. They also 
argue that simulations indicate that performance ratios are not sufficiently responsive to 
quality of service improvements but to reductions in access charges. If this is the case for 
many utilities, the share of quality incentives as total allowed revenues can be substantial. 
The effect of including the WTP for quality on total allowed revenues for some Swedish 
utilities may be stronger than those of the Norwegian utilities in Figure 1. 
 
For some firms with low quality performance, the transition to a high quality network may 
require large capital investments and time. At the same time, short-term performance 
considerations of such a transition, when firms are subject to annual ex-post assessments 
by NPAM, can provide disincentives to embark on large investments. Investment in service 
quality improvement is not inherently different from other investments. Indeed, the annual 
assessments by the NPAM are likely to be more influential than the technical details of 
service quality in the NPAM. Both the UK and Norwegian benchmarking models, despite 
their differences in approach, have succeeded in improving the quality of service. 
 
 
3.6 Promote long-term innovation and technical progress 
 
Innovation and technological progress are crucial for long-term efficiency of the individual 
firms as well as the sector as a whole. Achieving technical progress is closely associated 
with new investments. Future electricity distribution systems can be described as “active 
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 networks” that interact with both demand and supply sides. Industrial combined heat and 
power (CHP), distributed renewable generation, and micro-generation units installed by 
households equipped with smart meters will pose new challenges on networks to innovate 
and adopt new technologies. Most areas of the electricity industry anticipated to achieve 
technological progress in the coming decades have direct and indirect implications for the 
networks (see e.g. Jamasb et al., 2006). 
 
Technical change in the networks is dependent on the regulatory framework and 
incentives. Regulators should take into account the power of influence and long-term 
implications of incentive schemes in influencing the features and behaviour of regulated 
firm. In responding to benchmarking models and variables, firms may be led to follow 
some certain path. An important question is whether reference models and the NPAM can 
provide incentives for innovation towards achieving the dynamic networks of future?  
 
The NPAM is not built with a view to provide a framework and incentives for 
technological progress. An important question is the extent to which the regulator is able to 
continuously identify the latest technology frontiers and reflect these in the model. The 
likelihood that the regulators is able to constantly identify or predict a frontier and reflect 
this in the reference model is rather low. The NPAM only allows the regulator to look back 
at the recent past to identify and reflect the state of the art in the model with some 
(potentially significant) delay. 
 
Innovation has been described as a discovery process (Weisman and Pfeifenberger, 2003). 
It then follows that real firms and in particular frontier firms, can better represent best-
practice performance than reference networks. However, innovation takes place in the 
electricity sector as well as in other sectors of the economy. The complex nature of 
innovation process and its outcomes usually cannot be known in advance and thus 
internalised by the regulator. The inability of the NPAM to continuously reflect or promote 
technological change is a significant shortcoming of the model. Actual best-practice firms, 
under the right incentives, are the likely actors to represent the evolving nature of 
innovation in the sector. 
 
As discussed, in terms of promoting innovation, the NPAM is deterministic and backward 
looking. The evolution of best practice and innovation at the frontier are exogenous to the 
model. In frontier-based benchmarking a general technical change element may be 
incorporated ex-ante in the X-factor rather than being realised ex post. The NPAM’s design 
and parameters are at best based on technologies of recent past. As a result, the NPAM 
many penalise a firm that is in transition from an older specification to a more modern and 
advanced design that the NPAM implies. The design and cost components and design of 
the model can, therefore, differ from those of efficient real companies. 
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3.7 Regulatory uncertainty 
 
A key factor in effectiveness of incentive regulation regimes is their ability to create a stable 
regulatory framework. Regulatory uncertainty has negative implications for the behaviour, 
cost of capital, long-term investments, and innovation in the regulated firm. The regulatory 
framework should provide the companies with incentives to achieve their full potential in 
reducing inefficiency. This overriding priority holds even where the regulatory model may 
not immediately transfer the efficiency gains to customers. Failure to transfer the efficiency 
gains to consumers in the medium and long term is, however, a major shortcoming for any 
incentive regulation regime. Initially, it is preferable if the utilities gain some one-time 
benefits from efficiency improvements rather than not realising them altogether. 
 
Incentive regulation based on ex-post reviews inherently involves some uncertainty for the 
regulated firm. In addition, presence of uncertainty combined with annual reviews can 
reduce the firms’ incentive to engage in long-term efficiency enhancing measures in, 
particular, if the gains from these do not have a lasting benefit - i.e. they can be subject to 
regulatory taking quickly. As stated in Dalen (1998, p.108): “When the regulator is able to 
reduce firms’ private information ex post, we should expect to find reduced investment 
incentives ex ante”. 
 
Regulatory uncertainty can also be found in ex-ante regulation with, for example five-year, 
price control reviews. However, with annual ex-post price control reviews, the uncertainty 
of the regulatory contract, which may take one or two years (and in complex cases even 
longer) before being finalised, is likely to be higher and has significant negative effects on 
the firms’ cost of capital and incentives for investments in efficiency and innovation. 
 
 
3.8 Ensuring transparency 
 
Incentive regulation and benchmarking are conceptually based around the power of profit 
motive and market-oriented mechanisms which are inherently based on transparency. 
Therefore, transparency of the regulatory framework increases the effectiveness of an 
incentive models. In benchmarking, transparency should be applied to publication of data, 
decision rules and process, and results. There is often little known about the progress and 
achievements of incentive regulation and benchmarking regimes that lack transparency in 
these respects. Also, the lack of transparency is more likely to lead to regulatory capture by 
resourceful firms. 
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 Transparency has a disciplinary effect on the regulator and the firms but also facilitates 
participation and insight for other stakeholders and interest groups. Also, transparency 
leads to clarity of rules and procedures as it benefits from third-party participation in the 
process. Transparency should also be extended to open hearings, publication of 
consultation and opinion documents, and the final decisions. The well-performing 
incentive regulation regimes such as in Norway and the UK have operated with a high 
degree of transparency. 
 
The transparency principle also requires the use of reasonable amount of useful 
information. A regulatory process that produces large amount of information that is costly 
and lengthy to use does not reduce information asymmetry and leads to exclusion of third-
party interests. In a study of regulation of Chilean distribution companies, Di Tella and 
Dyck (2002) point out that collecting and processing excessive amount of information can 
be overwhelming and counterproductive for the regulator. Simple but well-designed 
regulatory models and processes can provide much useful information but at low cost to all 
the parties involved. 
 
The use of complex benchmarking models such as the NPAM inevitably tends to reduce 
the transparency of the regulatory model. In practice, given the highly technical nature of 
the NPAM, only the regulator and the individual firms will have the insight into and 
knowledge of the model details for each company. This effect can be strengthened when 
combined with frequent price control reviews of firms. The complexity and the sheer 
number of the NPAM models (one model for each firm) reduce the transparency of 
regulation and limits insight and participation of interest parties interests in the regulatory 
process. 
 
 
3.9 Summary of differences between NPAM and frontier-based benchmarking 
 
We defined a set of evaluation criteria drawn from best-practice incentive regulation and 
frontier-based benchmarking for assessing the use of norm models and reference firms in 
network regulation in the case of Sweden. The comparison and assessment of the NPAM 
using based on our evaluation criteria are summarised in Table 3.  
 
The use of the NPAM differs somewhat from those of frontier-based benchmarking 
methods. The model develops efficient standard reference networks to identify non-
performing real firms ex post which then may be subjected to detailed regulatory scrutiny 
and performance improvement requirement. In contrast, frontier-based benchmarking 
methods identify an efficient or best practice frontier of actual firms. Less efficient firms is 
then compared against this frontier and incentivised to move towards this frontier.  
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 Criteria NPAM 
Frontier  
Benchmarking 
1 
Model variables 
and 
environmental 
variables 
Essential variables for modelling the 
network are used in the models. One 
caveat is the dependence of several 
important parameters on customer 
density. Environmental variables are 
not included in the model. 
 
Usually a limited number of 
parameters are included in the models 
as there is degree of correlation 
between many of the important 
variables. 
2 Quality of service  
Cost of quality included in model. The 
effect of differences in quality 
performance may be large for some 
firms. 
In the UK, the service quality has 
been regulated outside of the 
benchmarking model through 
performance standards and penalty 
/reward attached to allowed revenues. 
In Norway, cost of quality has been 
included in the DEA models. 
 
3 
Efficient 
comparators 
 
For identification of asset 
requirements the reference model is 
an efficient comparator. For 
identifying capital base and O&M and 
their trade-offs and organisational 
feature the reference model is not a 
likely efficient comparator.  
 
The frontier is made-up of real firms 
representing best practice. Quality and 
comparability of data is important. 
4 
Sufficient 
investments 
 
Long term nature of investments and 
design improvement in conflict with 
frequent reviews. Possibility for case 
by case model driven effects.  
In the UK, capital investments have 
been regulated outside of the 
benchmarking model and investment 
plans have been reviewed for approval 
and incentivised. In Norway, where 
Totex is benchmarked, there are not 
apparent under-investments. 
 
5 
Long-term 
innovation 
 
Updates of the model are not 
substitute for evolutionary nature of 
innovation in real firms. 
Total factor productivity (TFP) and 
frontier shift analysis can serve as 
indicators of innovation and technical 
progress in the sector.  
 
6 
Consistency of 
results 
 
Unclear whether model results are 
consistent across the sector as well as 
with those of other methods. 
The consistency results of models and 
techniques can be examined to 
increase confidence.  
 
7 Uncertainty  
Uncertainty associated with frequent 
reviews within an ex-post approach 
likely to have negative effect on 
investments and innovation. 
Stability of the regulatory framework 
and consultations reduces uncertainty. 
Uncertainty may also be reduced 
through selecting appropriate length 
of price control reviews. 
 
8 Transparency  
The resource requirements of large 
number of models is non trivial. 
Information requirements, number of 
models and their technical nature are 
likely to reduce insight and third-party 
participation. 
 
Clarity of rules and openness of 
regulatory process and decisions 
provides equal information to all firms 
and facilitates third-party participation 
in the regulatory process. 
Table 3: Performance criteria and comparison of the NPAM and frontier-based benchmarking 
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 Finally, perhaps the most fundamental difference between reference firms and other 
incentive regulation models is also the most subtle one. Essentially, incentive regulation is 
based on the application of economic method and models to a regulated activity and 
provision of a public service - i.e. transportation of electricity over the networks. The 
concept of incentive regulation is therefore rooted in basic economic principles of profit 
motive and behaviour of firm and that, given the right framework and incentives, these will 
result in an efficient outcome. The structure of the firm, organisation of activities, and the 
processes by which the form achieves this outcome is generally regarded as a “black box” 
or a matter that is internal to the firm and not for intervention by the regulator.  
 
The use of reference models in incentive regulation, however, implicitly assumes that much 
of the structure, organisation, and processes of the regulated firm can be represented by an 
engineering model of the firm. The efficient operation and outcome from model firm is 
then derived as a deterministic result. It then follows that the engineering models of firms 
cannot reflect the flexibility, dynamism, synergies, and innovation drive of real firms and 
comparators. 
 
We have discussed some shortcomings with regards to structure and implementation of the 
NPAM. However the model can play a role as a regulatory benchmarking tool. This role 
should not be as the primary benchmarking tool but rather as a tool to be used in 
conjunction with frontier benchmarking methods. 
 
• Reference firms can be used to assess large new investments for asset renewal, 
network expansion, and distributed generation by the utilities and regulators. 
They can also facilitate interaction and settling of related disputes between them. 
• Reference firms can be a useful tool in assessing and overseeing the design of 
access charging methodologies and oversight of them (see Jamasb et al., 2005). 
• Reference firms would be more useful in regulation of transmission systems 
where the number of comparators is generally limited and the use of frontier 
techniques is difficult. 
• Reference firms are useful for countries with few companies which make the 
application of the commonly used benchmarking techniques difficult without 
resorting to international benchmarking. 
• Reference firms maybe useful; for developing countries where severe lack of 
reliable data does not allow for the use of frontier-based benchmarking in a 
transition period. However, the application of reference firms in countries with 
fast growing demand and rapidly expanding networks may be more difficult than 
in a mature system and slow growing demand as in Sweden. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The use of reference networks using norm models as an alternative to frontier-based 
approaches to benchmarking and regulation is appealing to some regulators. This paper 
defines a set of evaluation criteria concerning incentive properties and key regulatory issues 
to assess the model and compare it with frontier-based approach to benchmarking and 
incentive regulation. We examine the use of such models in the context of the Swedish 
network and finds that the differences between these two approaches are non-trivial.  
 
The NPAM can be characterised as a static and stylized representation of an efficient firm 
that non-performing firms need to achieve in the medium-term. It captures the main 
parameters necessary to model a distribution network. In this regard the model is more 
comprehensive and detailed than the production function of the frontier-based methods. 
Quality of service is incorporated in the model though the effect of including the cost of 
service quality on allowed revenues may vary considerably across the firms and can be 
rather high for some. 
 
However, several critical parameters of the model are highly dependent on customer 
density. While there is some empirical evidence for cost reducing effect of customer 
density, it makes the model highly deterministic upon a factor over which the firm has no 
control. The effect of such uncontrollable variables on firm performance is an empirical 
question that needs careful examination. In frontier-based benchmarking environmental 
variables may be included in the model if deemed significant or, alternatively, the efficiency 
scores can be controlled for their effects. The extent to which the reference model can 
capture the non-network aspects of firms and the synergies between the different functions 
of the firms is a shortcoming of the model. In practice, it may become necessary for the 
regulator to modify the model outcomes by applying judgement and discretion. 
 
When subjected to reference models, firms will also attempt to negotiate and perhaps 
influence the regulatory decisions. The outcome of such a process largely depends on the 
firms’ bargaining power and the regulator’s ability to develop proper design and assign 
correct costs to the reference models. Whether such outcome is superior to those of 
frontier-based incentive regulation models such as in Norway and the UK is doubtful. 
 
Reference models cannot allow for innovation in actual firms which is the main source of 
long-term technical change for the sector. The primary aim of regulation should be to 
develop appropriate incentives and create the conditions for these to work. It is important 
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 to allow the real networks to evolve at a natural pace. The NPAM is not likely to identify 
and reflect the dynamic and complex nature of product or process innovation in real firms. 
 
Despite the above shortcomings of the structure and use of the NPAM, the model can still 
play a role as a regulatory benchmarking tool. However, this role may not be as the primary 
or only benchmarking tool and rather as a supplement to, for example, frontier-based 
methods. We also pointed out several other potential areas where the NPAM is able to play 
a significant role. 
 
The combined effect of the model’s weaknesses is likely to be compounded by a short-
term regulatory framework which is based on annual reviews. In the model is applied 
within an ex-post regulatory approach. Admittedly, ex-post regulation becomes more 
difficult with long time lags something which may initially have led to annual applications 
of the model. The incentive properties of the regulatory framework of the model are not 
desirable as they create regulatory uncertainty and will have a negative effect on long-term 
investments and innovation and ultimately the performance of networks. However, it 
would be possible to improve these features of the model, without resorting to a frontier 
based model. 
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